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Do voters punish governments more severely during international economic crises or do they 
discount exogenous shocks as they recognize the government’s limited ‘room of manoeuvre’? The 
current literature provides conflicting answers to this question. This study argues that in such 
contexts citizens’ economic perceptions are less likely to predict their sanctioning behaviour but 
that, nonetheless, governments experience a higher cost of ruling. We show that in the paradigmatic 
case of Italy, government popularity during the crisis, while being hardly explained by economic 
evaluations, suffers a stronger decline as a function of time in office. We account for this increased 
cost of ruling by economic policy debates and other political events, such as cabinet crises and 
large-scale scandals. 
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The literature on economic voting suggests that citizens hold their governments 
accountable for economic performances. In particular, according to the ‘grievance asymmetry’ 
hypothesis, voters are expected to sanction the incumbents for economic downturns more than 
they reward them for economic upturns (Bloom and Price 1975, Dassonneville and Lewis-Beck 
2014, Nannestad and Paldam 1997). At the same time, previous research also shows that voters 
recognize the increasing constraints governments face under the pressure of financial markets and 
international institutions (Duch and Stevenson 2010, Hellwig and Samuels 2007, Lobo and 
Lewis-Beck 2012) and discount dire economic situations due to exogenous shocks (Kayser and 
Peress 2012). A period of intense economic turmoil with international ramifications may, thus, 
hamper citizens’ ability to sanction the government for the country’s economic performance. Yet, 
in the aftermath of the Great Recession, the electoral punishment of the incumbents has been 
massive (Bartels 2014, Hernández and Kriesi 2015), especially in the worst-hit countries of 
Southern Europe (Magalhães 2017), where the management of the crisis became the object of 
supranational interventions (Scharpf 2011).  
In light of contrasting theoretical expectations, this study tries to solve this empirical 
puzzle by analysing citizens’ evaluations of the incumbent government during the unfolding of 
the crisis rather than just on election day. We show that citizens’ economic perceptions have a 
modest impact on government approval as they discount exogenous economic shocks. 
Governments, nonetheless, experience a higher cost of ruling as citizens tend to sanction their 
responsibility toward financial markets and supranational institutions. We argue that during 
eventful periods governments adopt highly mediatized and hotly debated economic policies that 
affect voters’ political attitudes more than the fluctuation of the economy. We thus turn from the 
real economy (output) to economic policy (input) in search of the aggregate-level economic vote. 
In addition, we consider other manifestations of poor performance that shape citizen evaluations 




The political developments occurred in Italy make the country a fertile ground to test our 
argument. After the 1994 political earthquake, valence politics has shown increasing effects on 
the electoral behaviour of Italian citizens, with economic evaluations as key determinants of vote 
choice and government approval (Bellucci 2012, Bellucci and De Angelis 2013). More recently, 
Italian politics has been again turned upside down. Not only did the financial crisis have 
devastating consequences on the country’s economic outlook, it also strained the ability of Italian 
governments to cope with the threat of bond markets and European constraints. An analysis of 
Italian voters’ reaction to the Great Recession could thus be most revealing as to what we can 
expect from citizens’ political behaviour in hard times. 
 
Economic voting in times of crisis: grievance asymmetry or blurred responsibility?  
The impact of the economy on government popularity and incumbents’ support has been 
the subject of extensive scholarly debate. However, previous studies offer contrasting 
expectations about the influence of economic crisis on vote/popularity functions. One of the main 
tenets of the literature on economic voting states that citizens tend to punish their government for 
economic downturns more than they reward it for economic upturns – a phenomenon mostly 
known as ‘grievance asymmetry’ (Bloom and Price 1975, Nannestad and Paldam 1997). This 
claim is based on three related arguments: (i) citizens tend to give greater weight to negative than 
to positive information (Lau 1985); (ii) as negativity has a stronger impact than positivity, voters 
tend also to pay more attention to bad news (Soroka 2006); (iii) the heightened media salience of 
economic issues in times of crisis increases the impact of the economy on vote choices (Singer 
2011). Although in a previous assessment Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2013) concluded that 
evidence on the asymmetry hypothesis was mixed, a recent test shows that during ‘economic 
crisis, GDP growth relates more strongly to incumbent vote support’ (Dassonneville and Lewis-




However, existing theory also predicts that voters tend to discount exogenous shocks due 
to trends in the global economy, as they benchmark national economic growth against that abroad 
(Kayser and Peress 2012). The assumption is that voters recognize the government’s limited 
room to steer the country’s economic fortunes when these are visibly tied to global markets’ 
drifts. A large number of comparative studies has emphasized the impact of economic openness 
on the strength of the economic vote (e.g., Duch and Stevenson 2010, Hellwig and Samuels 
2007). In the case of Europe, the existence of supranational monetary institutions further blurs the 
attribution of responsibility, as individuals that consider the EU responsible for national 
economic policy, hold the government less responsible for economic performances (Lobo and 
Lewis-Beck 2012). 
These results highlight two important political factors that may have decisively blurred 
clarity of responsibility in the European countries that were most hit by the crisis. The first factor 
concerns the supranational interventions to which all Southern European countries were subjected 
(Scharpf 2011). The interferences in the management of the crisis constrained the governments’ 
manoeuvring space and allowed incumbent parties to play blame-shifting strategies. The second 
factor is the appointment of technocratic governments. In Italy, for example, the interlude of the 
Monti government allowed the parties to distance themselves publicly from the harsh measures 
imposed by the technocratic cabinet while supporting it in parliament (Bellucci 2014). Therefore, 
we argue that when the pressure of financial markets and supranational institutions limit 
governments’ ability to handle the economy, voters’ economic perceptions are less likely to 
predict their sanctioning behaviour. 
 
H1 (economic voting hypothesis): The effect of citizens’ economic perceptions on government 





Not only did financial and supranational constraints restrict the range of policy options, 
they also had consequences on public attitudes. As citizens perceived their own lack of choice to 
decide between policy alternatives, they became more dissatisfied with the functioning of their 
political system (Ruiz-Rufino and Alonso 2017). This suggests that, even if citizens found it 
difficult to attribute responsibility for the dire economic situation, they may have blamed their 
national government for choosing to be responsible toward the financial markets instead of 
responding to the electorate’s need (Mair 2013). Citizens’ negativity bias did not strengthen 
economic voting, but resulted in an increasing cost of ruling for incumbent governments. 
 
H2 (cost of ruling hypothesis): The negative impact of time in office on government approval 
increases in times of economic shocks. 
 
The decline of support for incumbent governments is one of the few established law of 
politics. However, it is still unclear why ruling is costly. Green and Jennings (2017) argue that 
governments experience a honeymoon period in their first months in office when responsibility is 
attributed to the outgoing government. From there on, when the incumbent starts to be blamed, a 
negativity bias operates so that ‘negative evaluations of competence are weighted more than 
positive evaluations, akin to the ‘grievance asymmetry’ argument of Nannestad and Paldam 
(2002)’ (Green and Jennings 2017, 175). As negative information piles up, blame displays a 
cumulative effect. Economic crises such as the Great Recession are eventful periods. Salient 
political events operate as ‘information shocks’ that update voters’ prior political beliefs. If cost 
of ruling is produced by the accumulation of negative evaluations of incumbent’s performance, 
the greater importance of some performance signals can explain its increased effect in times of 
international economic crises. In the next section, we suggest that policy debates and political 
events operate as such performance signals and can account for the increased cost of ruling 




The role of policy debates and political events 
A period of economic turbulence with international ramifications presents a difficult 
cognitive environment for voters to assign responsibility to incumbent parties and judge them 
solely by their economic record. By contrast, the crisis compelled governments to adopt highly 
mediatized and hotly debated economic policies that reached and resonated with a wider segment 
of the electorate than the fluctuation of economic variables. In this study, we thus turn from the 
real economy (output) to economic policy (input) in search of the aggregate-level economic vote. 
In addition to policy debates, we consider other manifestations of poor performance that shape 
citizen evaluations such as cabinet crises and large-scale scandals.  
Lewis-Beck et al. (2013) argue that economic voting should not just be about valence, i.e. 
about economic performance, but should extend to the voter’s position on economic policy and to 
what they call a ‘patrimonial’ dimension. Citizens punish and reward incumbents on the basis of 
economic performance, but they also rely on other aspects of the economy when making their 
choices. They assess central aspects of economic policy, and the positions they take also shape 
their political preferences. We suggest that policy-oriented economic voting may be a substitute 
for performance-oriented economic voting. When it is difficult to attribute responsibility for 
economic performance, the voters may fall back on policy-oriented economic assessments.  
We are interested in the effect of two sorts of economic policies that governments 
undertook in the wake of the recent economic crisis and their impact on government approval – 
stimulus measures and austerity measures. As is well known, in their first reactions to the Great 
Recession, most governments adopted fiscal expansionary measures relying on some version of 
‘liberal’ or ‘emergency Keynesianism’ (Pontusson and Raess 2012). As the crisis continued, 
governments turned to austerity measures. It was the Greek crisis erupting in early 2010 that 
initiated this change of policy. From then on, austerity policies including deep cuts in government 
expenditures, tax increases, and structural adjustment programs (above all labour market reforms 




Stimulus measures can be expected to increase the government’s popularity. By contrast, 
the existing literature turns out to be surprisingly inconclusive about public preferences towards 
fiscal consolidation or austerity. Views that voters support higher government spending due to 
self-interest (e.g. Golden and Poterba 1980) contrast with an increasingly popular view that 
voters are fiscally conservative and that governments can pursue fiscal consolidation without 
being punished by the electorate (Blinder and Holtz-Eakin 1984; Peltzman 1992). These findings 
supplemented Alesina’s ‘expansionary fiscal contraction’ thesis (Alesina et al. 2012): not only 
can fiscal consolidations have an expansionary economic effect, but these consolidation 
initiatives are also rewarded by voters.  
Yet, Armingeon and Giger (2008) show that the effect of welfare state retrenchment on 
election outcomes is conditional on whether or not it is a salient topic during the election 
campaign: it has a negative effect only when the issue is salient during the election campaign. 
This is to suggest that the policy-oriented economic assessments of the government depend on the 
salience of the government’s decisions. It is plausible to assume that highly salient decisions will 
have an immediate and possibly longer-term impact on the government’s popularity. It is 
important to add that, in times of crisis, the effects of fiscal consolidation measures may become 
more salient. Talving (2017) has shown that, during the Great Recession, incumbents have been 
punished for austerity measures and she concludes: ‘Turbulent times have resulted in citizens 
observing government economic policy decisions more closely and using this information to form 
their judgments on leaders’ economic competence’ (Talving 2017, 573).  
Following Talving’s lead, we expect austerity measures to have a detrimental effect on the 
incumbents’ electoral chances. By reducing government spending and increasing taxation, most 
attempts of fiscal consolidation place the burden of economic adjustment on the population. 
Moreover, austerity is often combined with structural reforms, which further causes economic 




implement austerity and structural reforms. Two examples from the Great Recession are provided 
by the Irish and Greek cases (Marsh and Mikhaylov 2012, Kosmidis 2014).  
 
H3 (stimulus measure hypothesis): Fiscal expansionary policies have a positive impact on 
government approval. 
H4 (austerity policy hypothesis): Austerity policies and structural reforms have a negative impact 
on government approval. 
 
When the responsibility for economic performance is blurred, voters may not only rely on 
policy-oriented economic voting, but it is also possible that government popularity may become 
dependent on entirely non-economic developments. As a possible alternative to policy-oriented 
economic voting, we consider political events such as scandals and cabinet-crises, which have 
been particularly salient during the Great Recession in the case of Italy. For other cases, different 
alternative political events might be considered.  
Scandals are expected to harm governmental (presidential) approval more when the 
economy is weak (Carlin, Love, and Martínez-Gallardo 2015). However, different types of 
scandals have a different impact. Financial scandals are likely to be more damaging to 
government (presidential) approval than moral scandals, unless abuse of power is involved 
(Doherty, Dowling, and Miller 2011). In the case of Italy, all scandals were related to the figure 
of Silvio Berlusconi, and were either financial or moral, with the latter involving some kind of 
abuse of power. 
 
H5 (scandal hypothesis): Scandals have a negative impact on government approval. 
 
As for the impact of cabinet crises, scholars have mainly focused on ministerial 




found to provide a corrective effect on government approval, after accounting for the effect of the 
scandals that produced them (Dewan and Dowding 2005). However, in multiparty systems, 
ministerial resignations may be caused by broader disagreement in the governing coalition. Under 
such circumstances, cabinet crises may signal to some partisan voters that the government is not 
their government anymore. Accordingly, we expect cabinet crises to be detrimental to 
government approval. 
 
H6 (cabinet crises hypothesis): Cabinet crises have a negative impact on government approval. 
 
Data, operationalisation, and methods 
This study is divided in two parts. The first one covers a period of nineteen years from 
May 1996 to December 2015 to analyse the effect of citizens’ economic perception on 
governments’ popularity in ordinary times and during the Great Recession. In the second part, the 
focus is restricted to the crisis’ years to analyse the impact of policy debates and political events. 
Figure 1 presents the two time series that will be used in the first part.  
<Figure 1> 
Government approval is measured as the percentage of positive answers to the following 
survey question: ‘How would you evaluate the work of the government until now? Very positive, 
positive enough, negative enough, completely negative.’1 Government approval is typically 
                                                       
1 We obtained part of the data on government popularity from Bellucci and De Angelis (2012), whose original 
sources were the polling companies ISPO and IPSOS. We updated their time series with data collected on the 
institutional website www.sondaggipoliticoelettorali.it. Data collection was carried out by Computer-Assisted-
Telephone-Interviewing. Missing values amounted to 11.4 percent. Most of them concern the month of August 
and those months when a resigning government was not immediately substituted by a new government. We 





characterized by a strong autoregressive component. Our series of government approval is 
stationary (Dickey Fuller test = -4.765, p-value = 0.001) and follows an auto-regressive process 
with one lag (AR1). We have also tested for unknown breaks in the series by applying a set of 
tests. The procedure proposed by Bai and Perron (1998) suggests that there are no breaks in the 
series. However, as a recursive F-test suggests a break for the Monti government, we control for 
the political leaning of every government: left-wing (the reference category), right-wing (i.e., 
Berlusconi), or technocratic (i.e., Monti).  
For citizens’ economic perceptions, we use the deseasonalised economic sentiment 
indicator provided by the Italian statistics bureau (Isae/Istat). It is a composite indicator made up 
of nine confidence indicators obtained from monthly surveys of households. These indicators tap 
prospective and retrospective evaluations of the general economic situation, expectations on 
unemployment, prospective and retrospective evaluations on households’ financial situation, 
current opportunity and future possibility of savings, current opportunities of durable goods 
purchases, assessments on family budget.2 The series is not stationary, as is indicated by the 
results of Dickey-Fuller test (test statistics= -1.881, p-value = 0.3412). This is why we use the 
differenced indicator, which, indeed, is stationary. In other words, we analyse how monthly 
changes in economic sentiment influences the approval ratings. 
To test the first two hypotheses, we analyse whether the relationship between economic 
evaluations and popularity holds if we split the sample at the start of the crisis, and whether the 
negative effect of a time trend is stronger during the crisis. We choose to set the cut-off on 
September 2008 when the fall of Lehman Brothers made clear the international ramifications of 
the subprime crisis. These models are estimated by straight-forward OLS-procedures (De Boef 
and Keele 2008).  
                                                       
2 More information on the Economic Sentiment Indicator, including the exact wording of the survey questions, 




In the second part of the paper, we study the impact of political events during the crisis 
and the first question is how we can identify the most consequential events. Our key 
methodological hunch has been to use the international press to identify the relevant events. The 
idea behind this hunch is that the international press, given its limited ‘carrying capacity’, has to 
be selective and will report on a given country only under exceptional circumstances (Hilgartner 
and Bosk 1988). This apparent disadvantage constitutes a decisive methodological advantage. 
Given that we are looking for events that made a difference in the political life of the country, we 
have collected data on political events in Italy in three international sources – the Financial 
Times, the New York Times and the Swiss NZZ.3 
For the analysis of the events, we rely on a combination of a qualitative and a quantitative 
approach. We selected the candidates for key events based on the analysis of the list of events 
resulting from our analysis of the international press and our qualitative knowledge of the case. In 
each category – policy debates, scandals, cabinet crises – we selected the events with the largest 
number of mentions in the international press (see Table A1 in the online appendix). For the 
quantitative tests of the impact of events on government approval, we shall adopt the customary 
practice to rely on dummies. Among the several models underlying the use of dummies, a 
temporary step-shift model shall be adopted, in which a given event influences the approval of the 
government until its resignation. In temporary step-shift models, dummies are operationalized by 
0’s prior to the event, 1’s for the period starting in the month of the event and until the end of the 
government to which the event relates, and again 0’s until the end of the series.  
The use of dummy variables to indicate the effect of events runs into four types of 
problems. First, there is the problem of omitted variables. Having already accounted for the only 
significant break in the series, the shift related to the Monti government, and having shown that 
                                                       
3 We chose three international high quality newspapers which have Italian correspondents, which have a strong 




there are no other breaks in the series, we can test whether the political dummies have an 
incremental explanatory power (Caporale and Grier 2005, 85). Second, the introduction of a 
series of dummies for specific events is susceptible to the problem of overfitting. When the time 
series is rather short, there may not be enough information in the data for more than only few 
parameters. We deal with this problem by constructing composite indicators for each type of 
event. These measures are equal to 1 for the months from the occurring of the first event to the 
end of a given government, and to 1.5 for the months from the occurring of the second event (if 
there is one) to the end of the respective government. The second event is weighted less heavily 
than the first one, assuming that the shock to the public of the first event is greater than the shock 
of the second one. Moreover, there may also be a floor effect, i.e. as a government’s popularity 
has been wearing down it is approaching its equilibrium value, which means that additional 
events will have only a limited effect. 
Finally, the effect of the events we focus on may not be clearly separable from each other. 
Different types of events may coincide or interact in time. There is no hard and fast solution to 
this problem. Tables A2 and A3 in the appendix show the pairwise correlations among individual 
events and event indices. The strongest correlation occurs between scandals and cabinet crises, 
and is mainly driven by the cabinet crisis pushed by Fini. Scandals are also correlated with 
austerity measures insofar as they occur almost contemporaneously at the end of the Berlusconi 
government. To address these concerns, we analyse the impact of different types of events in 
separate models. The details of the narratives that accompany the models supplement the 
weakness of the statistical analysis and clarify the mechanisms at work. 
Unlike the models of the first part of this study, in the second part we do not include a 
trend dummy but we control for the honeymoon only: this takes the value of 1 in the month of the 
appointment, and 0 otherwise. As argued above, cost of ruling can be explained by two elements: 
the initial honeymoon and the accumulation of negative evaluations. The time trend captures both 




the analysis we introduce the time trend, while in the second part, when the accumulation of 
negative evaluations is modelled with our political events, we only include the honeymoon 
dummy as control. Indeed, the time trend is correlated with both the honeymoon and almost all 
the event variables. 
 
 
The impact of the Great Recession 
Italy experienced a ‘double-dip’ recession. First, like all the other European countries, it 
took a heavy hit in the aftermath of the fall of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, from which it 
recovered rather rapidly, like the Northwestern European countries. In the third quarter in 2011, 
however, the economic sentiment started to decline, and the real economy did so, too. Thus, the 
first recession and recovery characterize the Berlusconi government, but towards the end of his 
reign the economy turned bad again. From the end of the Monti government and throughout the 
brief period of Letta’s government, the economy improved, only to fall back again into a period 
of stagnation during the period of the Renzi government covered in this study. 
The economic sentiment indicator clearly shows the double-dip recession (Figure 1). 
Already a comparative inspection of the two series in Figure 1 suggests that the government’s 
popularity has hardly been affected by the economic development during the crisis period. 
Berlusconi got rather unscathed through the first part of the Great Recession. In the midst of the 
recession, Berlusconi’s party won two regional elections in fall 2008 and the European elections 
in June 2009. Berlusconi’s approval ratings only started to fall seriously in early 2010, when the 
economy actually improved. When the economy started to enter into the second recession in 
summer 2010, Berlusconi’s approval ratings had already fallen to low levels.  
As we see, Monti at first enjoyed an enormous popularity, although the economy was 




recession and his government adopted a series of highly unpopular austerity measures. At the end 
of Monti’s interregnum, with the coming to power of the Letta government, the second recession 
was coming to an end, and the economic sentiment index was improving. In spite of the 
economic recovery, Letta’s approval ratings fell immediately after taking office, unrelated to the 
economy. With Renzi, finally, even if the economy did not improve significantly, the economic 
sentiment indicator skyrocketed beyond pre-crisis levels. Nonetheless, Renzi’s approval ratings 
started a precipitous decline. 
A more formal test confirms that the economy can hardly explain the development of 
government approval during the crisis. Table 1 presents three models. The first covers the full 
period (1996-2015), while the other two cover respectively the period before the crisis and the 
crisis period. The coefficient for the economic sentiment indicator is significant for both the full 
period (Model 1) and the pre-crisis period (Model 2), and the latter is slightly stronger. By 
contrast, in the crisis model (Model 3) the effect of economic perceptions is not significant at all, 
while the trend variable for time in office exerts a much stronger impact on approval ratings 
(more than ten times stronger compared to the pre-crisis model). These results lend support to 
hypotheses 1 and 2.4 
<Table 1> 
 
The impact of policy debates 
Although it did not have much of a direct effect on the government’s approval ratings 
during the Great Recession, the economy may well have had an indirect effect, mediated by 
public policies. By forcing the government to adopt highly unpopular policies, the economy may 
                                                       
4 As robustness check, we also employed a “segmented trends” model whereby approval ratings are governed 
by a two-state, first-order Markov switching process. The results presented in the online appendix further 




still have been the ultimate driver of government approval ratings. Once the Great Recession had 
hit Italy, Berlusconi’s government like all other European governments proceeded to adopt 
stimulus measures to overcome the crisis. The first stimulus package was already adopted in 
October 2008, the last set of measures dates from summer 2009. Like most other governments, 
the Berlusconi government also changed track in the shadow of the Greek crisis. On May 17, 
2010, at the time of the first Greek bailout, the Financial Times titled: ‘Berlusconi volte-face 
shocks Italy’. While Berlusconi had won elections two years earlier with promises to cut taxes 
and get Italy back on its feet, he now told Italians that they also needed to feel the pain of 
austerity to plug a forecast €25bn hole in the government budget by 2012. In spite of the 
resistance from the street, the first Berlusconi austerity package was passed in a vote of 
confidence in July 2010.  
One year later, in summer 2011, at the time when the second bailout package for Greece 
was agreed upon, fears of contagion exploded and Italy became the object of ‘implicit 
conditionality’. The government presented plans for additional cuts in May 2011, but repeatedly 
put off decisions, backtracked and continued the discussion throughout the summer. External 
pressure (notably from the ECB but also from other European governments) became even more 
intense as Italy was hit by a financial storm. After the Senate finally approved a package of 
austerity measures on November 12, Berlusconi stepped down and was replaced by the 
technocratic Monti government which received the support of both his party and the left-wing 
PD. 
Monti came to power on a wave of popularity. However, his honeymoon quickly ended as 
he presented his emergency budgetary measures and structural reforms referring mostly to the tax 
system and the pension system. After a week of stormy debates Monti’s emergency measures 
were supported by a grand coalition of most major parties. After the mostly failed attempt to 
liberalize some professional orders, the final act in Monti’s reform effort came in March 2012, 




the proposal was adopted in June 2012. From that point on, austerity no longer dominated the 
agenda of Italian politics. Only the issue of labor market reform was taken up again by the Renzi 
government. Against fierce resistance from the union, whose large-scale mobilizations in the fall 
of 2014 Renzi chose to ignore, the so-called ‘Jobs’ Act’ was adopted in spring 2015. 
To capture the impact of these major policy debates, we introduce a series of temporary 
step-shift dummies, one each for Berlusconi’s stimulus packages (starting in October 2008), 
Berlusconi’s first austerity program (starting in May 2010), Berlusconi’s second austerity 
program (starting in May 2011), Monti’s austerity program (starting in December 2011, just one 
month after his accession to power), Monti’s labor market reform (starting in March 2011), and 
Renzi’s labor market reform (starting in October 2014). Table 2 presents the effects of the various 
policy debates. Model 1 includes step-shift dummies for all six policy debates. Four of these 
debates (the initial stimulus package, the austerity packages under Berlusconi and Monti and 
Renzi’s labor-market reform) have a significant effect on government approval.5 The most 
important effect is that of Monti’s first austerity package. This effect largely undoes Monti’s 
initial popularity. Once the public realizes what the Monti government had in mind, Monti’s 
popularity is no longer exceptional. Replacing the individual dummies by the summary indicator 
for austerity measures and structural reforms simplifies the pattern of effects. The average effect 
of austerity debates remains substantial (roughly -7.5 percent in the approval rating for the first 
package and -11 percent for the combination of two packages). The resulting model suggests that 
the Great Recession’s effect on government popularity was above all mediated by the policy 
measures it imposed on the Italian government. 
                                                       
5 To be sure, also Berlusconi’s second austerity package and Monti’s labor market reform have a significant 
negative impact when introduced in a model respectively without Berlusconi’s and Monti’s first austerity 







The impact of scandals and cabinet crises 
Italian politics throughout the period covered cannot be understood without taking into 
account the many scandals created by Silvio Berlusconi. These scandals run like a subtext across 
the politics of Italy during this period. They made the international press in 50 percent of the 
months of the Berlusconi IV government, and in still 36 percent of the months of his successors. 
Among the large number of scandals related to Berlusconi, three notably stand out – the so called 
Rubygate, the question of Berlusconi immunity, and the case of tax fraud.  
Chronologically, the immunity issue came first. On September 18, 2009, Italy’s 
Constitutional court ruled that the law which was regulating the penal immunity of Berlusconi 
was in breach of the principle that all Italians were equal before the law. The ruling was a 
stunning blow for Silvio Berlusconi, who had been dogged for decades by legal problems. In 
November Berlusconi presented a judicial reform bill that would reduce the length of Italy’s long 
trials, including his own – a sort of indirect amnesty law for him. The draft law was met with 
immediate protests in the street, and was also contested within Berlusconi’s own party giving rise 
to conflicts with Fini.  
Rubygate, the most spectacular scandal, broke the news on October 30, 2010. Berlusconi 
had been paying a Moroccan prostitute Karima El Mahroug, also known by the stage name of 
Ruby Rubacuori (Italian for ‘Ruby the heartstealer’), for sexual services earlier in 2010, when she 
was under the age of 18. In May 2010, when Ruby had been arrested by the police, Berlusconi 
intervened several times per telephone on her behalf, using trumped up assertions (he asserted 
that she was Mubarak’s niece) in order to get her free. After the affair broke into the public, it 




The Berlusconi IV government was, indeed, characterized by a series of tensions between 
Berlusconi and Gianfranco Fini, the former leader of AN. The rift between the two became 
serious in April 2010, when Fini criticized Berlusconi for being too close to the Lega Nord, his 
coalition partner. On July 30, 2010, the conflict between the two led Fini to create a new party of 
his own. After this initial break, the crisis between the two escalated with Fini asking Berlusconi 
to step down.  
The tax fraud scandal played out mainly under the post-Berlusconi governments. The tax 
fraud in question relates to Berlusconi’s Mediaset corporation and amounted to a sum of more 
than €62 million. In October 2012, Berlusconi was convicted in this case and sentenced to four 
years imprisonment. He was also banned from running for public office for a five-year term. In 
reaction to this series of events, Berlusconi threatened to topple the Monti government. He soon 
made his threats come true and pulled the plug on Monti in December 2012. As a result, Monti 
handed in his resignation and his government became a ‘nonpartisan caretaker’ until the 
parliamentary elections in February 2013 and the formation of the new government in April 
2013.  
The new Letta government was led by the PD, but needed the support of the PdL, because 
it had not obtained a majority in the Senate, Italy’s second chamber. In September 2013, as a 
reaction to his final conviction in the tax fraud case, Berlusconi withdrew his ministers. In 
reaction to this step, the centre-right split. While Berlusconi recreated his former party Forza 
Italia, Alfano and his allies founded a new party which continued to support the government.  
<Table 3> 
Table 3 presents the empirical test for the impact of scandals and cabinet crises. In model 
1 we introduce two temporary step-shift dummies to account for the Berlusconi scandals, one 
each for the immunity scandal (starting in October 2009), and for Rubygate (starting in November 
2011). As it turns out, only the scandal relating the Moroccan prostitute has a significant effect on 




without consequences as it intensified the crisis of Berlusconi’s cabinet. In model 2, we thus 
introduce temporary step-shifts for the Fini crisis, Berlusconi’s provocation of the demise of 
Monti’s government (including the caretaker government) as well as for the immediate paralysis 
of the Letta government, starting directly after the honeymoon (Letta1), and for the crisis 
provoked by the split in the centre-right (Letta2). Two of these crises had a significant negative 
effect on government approval: the crisis pushed by Gianfranco Fini and the crisis that ended the 
Monti government. While the two crises involving the Letta government do not capture the rapid 
decline of its popularity, the synthetic indicator for cabinet crises prove to be a significant 
predictor in Model 3. The scandal index, instead, is not significant.6 These results provide mixed 
support for hypotheses 5 and 6. Some political events did affect the popularity of Italian 
governments, but others did not. 
Table 4 presents our final models. Based on model 1, which includes the stimulus 
indicator and the two relevant indices (austerity and cabinet-crisis index) in addition to the 
controls and the lagged dependent variable, we can calculate the long-term effect of the various 
factors. To do so, we need to divide its coefficient(s) by (1-where  is the effect of the lagged 
dependent variable. We calculate that the first austerity package in a given government cost it on 
average 14 percent in terms of approval ratings. Governments which adopted two packages, as is 
the case with Berlusconi’s and Monti’s government, lost 21 percent of approval in the process.  
By contrast, Berlusconi’s government benefited to the tune of 6 approval points from its stimulus 
packages. The average cost of a cabinet crisis for a government is 7 percent. In model 2, we 
substitute the honeymoon dummy with the trend term for time in office to test whether political 
events do capture the cost of ruling during the Great Recession. Our modelling strategy proves to 
be convincing. If we compare this final model with model 3 in Table 1 we show that policy 
                                                       
6 The synthetic indicators for scandals is not significant even if introduced without controlling for cabinet crises 




debates and cabinet crises account for two thirds of the cost of ruling in times of economic 
shocks. Finally, we introduce again the economic sentiment indicator. Economic perceptions do 




The starting point of this study has been a theoretical puzzle as to what we can expect 
from citizens’ sanctioning behaviour in times of international economic crises. We have proposed 
and empirically tested a mechanism that can account for both the limited impact of economic 
evaluations on government popularity and the increasing cost of ruling incumbent governments 
experience after exogenous shocks. We have argued that during eventful periods such as the 
Great Recession we need to turn our attention to ‘performance signals’ that resonates more than 
the monthly fluctuations of the economy. Therefore, we have tried to account for the 
government’s approval rating by political events and we have found that there are at least four 
types of events that have contributed to the ups and (mainly) downs of the government’s 
popularity: stimulus packages, austerity packages, cabinet crises, and the ever present vicissitudes 
of Silvio Berlusconi’s wheelings and dealings. The most important effect is exerted by the 
austerity policies which successive governments adopted in the shadow of the Great Recession. 
Even if the economy did not have a direct impact, the popularity of Italian governments has been 
to a large extent dependent on the political mediation of the economic crisis. 
This study comes with certain limitations. The main one derives from the inherent 
difficulty for time series models to account for the influence of political factors (Caporale and 
Grier 2005). While we have acknowledged that the use of wave dummies is prone to many 
shortcomings, we hope to have convinced the reader that a mixed-method approach that 




political events. On another note, the selection of what is usually thought to be a rather peculiar 
case can be a source of scepticism for the generalizability of this study. While we do not claim 
that our results are exportable to all settings, we have nonetheless shown that Italian politics has 
not been so peculiar as citizens’ economic perceptions regularly predicted government approval 
before the crisis. Moreover, the political developments which occurred in Italy during the Great 
Recession are not so different from those of other Southern European countries. If anything, they 
make the country a paradigmatic case to test the combined effect of ‘grievance asymmetry’ and 
‘blurred responsibility’ theories. 
In the end, our results suggest a certain degree of optimism. From the perspective of 
democratic accountability, the instability in the relationship between the economy and citizen 
behaviour challenges ‘the normative foundation of the economic voting paradigm’ (Anderson 
2007, 276). However, we have shown that even when the attribution of responsibility for 
economic output is a particularly difficult cognitive task, voters can find a shortcut. In forming 
their responsibility judgements, they can take into account economic inputs and other political 
manifestations of poor performance. Indeed, Johan Olsen has recently suggested that demands for 
accountability are conditional on shifting public attention, because citizens tend to be ‘activated 
by extraordinary events, disasters, performance crises, scandals, or conflicts’ (Olsen 2017, 529). 
In this respect, our findings confirm the limitations of theorizing accountability procedures only 
as output-evaluating devices (Busuioc and Lodge 2016). The contingency of economic voting 
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FIGURE 1 – Government approval and economic sentiment indicator 
 
Note: Variables are standardized. Vertical solid lines mark legislative elections; vertical dashed lines mark changes 







TABLE 1 – The impact of economic evaluations on government approval 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 may96-dec15 may96-aug08 sep08-dec15 
Popularity t-1 0.678*** 0.803*** 0.126 
 (0.043) (0.051) (0.086) 
 Economic sentiment 0.399** 0.405** -0.006 
 (0.136) (0.132) (0.224) 
Time in office -0.164*** -0.076** -0.832*** 
 (0.032) (0.025) (0.096) 
Berlusconi 2.678** 1.316 13.415*** 
 (0.811) (0.696) (1.905) 
Monti 4.548*** 6.671*** 
 (1.334) (1.627) 
Constant 12.524*** 7.143*** 41.056*** 
 (1.740) (1.868) (4.196) 
Observations 235 147 88 
AIC 1415.10 792.38 540.90 
BIC 1435.86 807.33 555.77 
R2 0.73 0.74 0.78 







TABLE 2 – The impact of policy debates 
 
 Model 1 Model 2
Popularity t-1 0.657*** 0.537***





Berlusconi -0.125 -0.250 
 (0.194) (0.195)
Stimulus (b) 2.402* 2.753**







Labor reform (m) -2.900  
 (2.529)  





 (3.022) (2.709) 
Observations 91 91
AIC 499.56 508.17
BIC 527.17 525.74 
R2 0.90 0.88











TABLE 3 – The impact of scandals and cabinet crises 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Popularity t-1 0.747*** 0.735*** 0.741*** 
 (0.057) (0.056) (0.054) 
Monti 2.381 2.385 2.164 
 (1.434) (1.431) (1.382) 
Berlusconi 0.165 0.193 0.195 
 (0.253) (0.250) (0.243) 
Honeymoon 21.712*** 21.680*** 21.565*** 







Monti resignation -3.839* 
 (1.923)
Letta crisis 1 -2.802 
 (2.244)
Letta crisis 2 -1.018
 (3.404) 
Cabinet crisis Index -3.229** 
 (1.121) 
Scandals Index -0.412 
 (0.998) 
Constant 8.668*** 10.023*** 9.817*** 
 (2.438) (2.478) (2.434) 
Observations 91 91 91
AIC 543.60 542.58 538.99 
BIC 561.17 565.18 556.57 
R2 0.82 0.83 0.83







TABLE 4 – Final models 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Popularity t-1 0.449*** 0.187* 0.454*** 
 (0.054) (0.073) (0.055) 
Monti 11.986*** 13.911*** 11.918*** 
 (1.589) (2.134) (1.601) 
Berlusconi 0.000 0.014 -0.011 
 (0.182) (0.229) (0.184) 
Honeymoon 15.034*** 15.174*** 
 (2.026) (2.050) 
Stimulus (b) 3.008*** 6.474** 3.036*** 
 (0.816) (1.973) (0.821) 
Austerity Index -7.803*** -8.674*** -7.686*** 
 (1.002) (1.616) (1.028) 
Cabinet crisis Index -3.897*** -3.901*** -3.898*** 
 (0.827) (1.087) (0.831) 
Time in office -0.295* 
 (0.135)
 Economic sentiment 0.080 
 (0.144) 
Constant 24.055*** 38.202*** 23.793*** 
 (2.614) (3.584) (2.668) 
Observations 91 91 91 
AIC 488.59 529.78 490.25 
BIC 508.68 549.87 512.85 
R2 0.90 0.85 0.90 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Sig. levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
 
